This paper uses nationally-representative data from the PSID and CDS to estimate the causal effects of two parent socialization actions on children's charitable giving. We develop a framework that shows how different identifying assumptions about parental response to timevarying unobserved child heterogeneity can be combined with the child fixed effects estimate and the difference over time between siblings estimate to infer a bound on the causal effect of a parental socialization action. Under the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable, our estimates imply that talking to children about giving raises the probability that children give by at least .13. We find no evidence that parental role-modeling affects children's giving, except among non-African-American girls. The results have implications for raising charitable children, and suggest that translational research is needed to learn how role-modeling, known to be effective in the laboratory, can be used effectively in the home.
Introduction
Little is known about the effects of actions parents take to socialize their children to give to charity.
Although an extensive experimental literature from developmental psychology has established the existence of causal effects of role-modeling and verbal socialization on children's giving in laboratory settings (Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006) , there is little empirical evidence about the existence and magnitude of causal effects from nationally-representative data collected from children's home settings. Lacking this evidence, it is not known whether parents are effectively using either rolemodeling or verbal socialization to raise charitable children.
In this paper we provide the first estimates of the causal effects of role-modeling and verbal socialization that use nationally-representative data from children in their home settings. Using give and whether their parents talk to them about giving. We estimate individual and sibling fixed effects specifications and two additional specifications seldom considered: across-time sibling fixed effects (older sibling data collected at an earlier time is differenced from younger sibling data collected at a later time) and a difference over time between siblings estimator. Estimates from these specifications identify causal effects depending upon the assumptions one makes about how parents' socialization actions respond to children's unobserved prosocial endowments. As is well-known, the sibling fixed effects estimator is consistent for the causal effect if parent socialization actions neither compensate nor reinforce differences between the child's specific endowment and his sibling's specific endowment (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman However, it is hard to defend the assumption that the unobserved environment is time-constant in the child development context. If the parent's socialization actions respond to time-varying changes in the child's prosocial environment then the individual fixed effects estimator is no longer consistent. The difference over time between siblings estimator would be consistent as long as parental socialization neither compensates nor reinforces within-sibling differences that arise because of time-varying changes in the children's idiosyncratic environments. In this way, identifying assumptions about compensation/reinforcement reappear despite the use of child fixed effects.
Maintaining that parents neither compensate nor reinforce within-sibling changes in environments is a strong identifying assumption.
In the paper we show how different identifying assumptions about compensation/reinforcement and substitution/complementarity, constructs from the intra-household allocation (Becker and Tomes 1976) and cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2011) literatures, can be combined with the child fixed effects estimate and the difference over time between siblings estimate to infer a bound on the causal effect of parental action to socialize their children to give to charity. Which of the two estimates is interpreted as the bound depends upon qualitative assumptions about compensation/reinforcement and substitution/complementarity. Some combinations of identifying assumptions can be ruled out (e.g., reinforcement plus substitution) because they are incompatible with the estimates. Other assumptions (e.g., complementarity) may be given less weight because they counter much thinking in the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission literatures. In any event our results about the relationship between intra-household allocation and cultural transmission assumptions, the biases they imply, and our estimates narrow the range of causal interpretations about the effects of parental actions to socialize their children's giving.
Our identification approach is generally applicable to empirical analyses using cross-time variation and cross-sibling variation to estimate the effects of a wide variety of parental investments to achieve child outcomes, and points to the kind of data needed to further narrow the range of causal interpretations in such analyses.
Background
An extensive experimental literature in which adult experimenters role-model giving and/or talk about giving suggests that these are effective actions parents can take to socialize children's giving. 1 Accordingly, role-modeling and talking to children about giving are emphasized in the practical literature on raising charitable children (Gallo and Gallo 2001; Weisman 2006) . Despite this consensus, it is not known whether role-modeling and verbal socialization, effective in laboratory settings, are being effectively used in the home (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989, p. 156) . Furthermore, because the experimental results are based on small, relatively homogeneous samples, generalization to the population has not been established. To our knowledge the only work at the population level are cross-sectional results that both parental role-modeling and verbal socialization have large associations with children's giving money to charities (Brown, Srivastava, and Taylor 2012; OttoniWilhelm, Estell, and Perdue 2011). These results provide initial evidence that causal effects seen in the laboratory may extend to home settings and generalize to the population, but it is not known how much of these cross-sectional associations are due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Standard approaches to mitigating unobserved heterogeneity include individual fixed effects and sibling fixed effects models. Most previous papers using sibling fixed effects are not explicitly investigating parental investment in children, and therefore do not use a conceptual framework based on intra-household allocation (e.g., Altonji and Dunn 1996a, 1996b; Geronimus and Korenman 1992). However, a standard conceptual framework in the parental investment literature is Becker and Tomes' (1976) intra-household allocation model. The Becker-Tomes model posits that a parent's investment in her children responds to differences in child-specific endowments either 1 For examples of role-modeling experiments, see Bryan and Walbek (1970) , Dressel and Midlarsky (1978) , Grusec, Sass-Kortsaak, and Simutis (1978), Israel and Raskin (1979) , Owens and Ascione (1991), Rice and Grusec (1975) , Rushton (1975) , White and Burnam (1975) ; cf. Lipscomb, Bregman, and McAllister (1983) . For experiments that involve talking about donating, see Dlugokinski and Firestone (1974) , Dressel and Midlarsky (1978) , EisenbergBerg and Geisheker (1979), Grusec, Sass-Kortsaak, and Simutis (1978), Israel and Brown (1979) , Israel and Raskin (1979) , McGrath, Wilson, and Frasetto (1995), Perry, Bussey, and Freiberg (1981), Rice and Grusec (1975) , Smith, Leinbach, Stewart, and Blackwell (1983); cf. Bryan and Walbek (1970) , Lipscomb, Bregman, and McAllister (1983) . This list is not exhaustive, see Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad (2006) and the earlier Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) for authoritative reviews. Results from the role-modeling experiments are robust across most of the experiments, while results from the talking-about-donating experiments are somewhat more mixed.
by compensating for those differences (investing more in the less endowed child) or by reinforcing the differences (investing more in the more endowed child). Under the identifying assumption that parental investment is neutral-neither compensating nor reinforcing differences between children's specific endowments-sibling fixed effects specifications consistently estimate causal effects of parental investment. Because neutrality is a strong assumption, the utility of sibling fixed effects models in this situation can be questioned (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994;  Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1995; also see Ermisch and Francesconi 2001, pp. 263ff ). Individual fixed effects would seem preferable because they yield consistent estimates of causal effects regardless of whether parents compensate or reinforce child-specific endowments, under the identifying assumption that other unobserved heterogeneities that are correlated with parental investments, such as the child-specific environment, is time-constant.
A problem with individual fixed effects applied to children during the childhood years is that the child development literature calls into question the assumption that child-specific environments are time-constant. As the child ages, the child-specific environment changes through encounters with formal institutions (child-care, schools, neighborhood organizations, religious congregations, media) and informal networks (friends, neighbors), and parents would likely respond to these changes (Berk 2003; Bisin and Verdier 2011) . In our application changes in the child-specific environment can lead to changes in the child's unobserved prosocial values that in turn affect giving.
The term "environment" is more familiar to economists, and we will use this term synonymously with "prosocial values." It is well-known that prosocial values change as children age (Eisenberg 1986 ).
Becker and Tomes (1979, p. 1167) use now standard "family income" reasoning to argue that parents invest less in children when child-specific environments ("endowment luck" in their terminology) increase. This kind of parental substitution in response to changes in environments is akin to "cultural substitution" from the cultural transmission literature (Bisin and Verdier 2011).
Mapping these constructs to our charitable giving application, "parental investment" is action taken to socialize children to give ("vertical transmission") and changes in child-specific prosocial values come about through encounters with formal institutions and informal networks that also socialize giving ("horizontal transmission"). Bisin and Verdier (2001) show that if parental socialization and horizontal socialization are substitutes then the outcome being socialized will become heterogeneous in the population; alternatively if parental and horizontal socialization are strong enough cultural complements the outcome being socialized will become homogeneous. The fact that charitable giving is heterogeneous in the population suggests that parental and horizontal socializations are cultural substitutes, or at least any cultural complementarity is not strong.
2 If parental actions to socialize children's giving and horizontal socialization are cultural substitutes then child fixed effects estimator of the effect of parental actions would be downward biased.
A potential approach to mitigating the bias created by time-varying child-specific prosocial values is to model the unobservable with a child-specific trend. This approach requires at least three observations per child across time, a requirement not satisfied by the data available for many studies, including ours. Alternatively, the availability of sibling data permits the modeling of a family-specific trend: the "difference over time between siblings" estimator (Levine,
Gustafson, and Velenchik 1997). While this estimator differences out unobserved time-varying environment that is common to both siblings, it also re-introduces in a time-varying context the compensation/reinforcement constructs from the intra-household allocation model. Hence both the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission models are necessary to understand the differences in potential biases between the child fixed effects and the difference over time between siblings estimators. Previous work has not derived the differences in potential biases.
The present paper derives the differences in biases under different qualitative identifying assumptions about compensation/reinforcement and cultural substitution/complementarity. Our empirical work shows that knowledge of these differences combined with the child fixed effects and difference over time between siblings estimates can be used to infer a bound on the causal effect of a parental socialization action. This is similar in spirit to the approach developed by Ribar (1999) in which a qualitative identifying assumption about the relationship between the child-specific covariance (between the unobserved child-specific endowments in the outcome equation and the "action" equation) and cross-sibling covariance combined with the sibling fixed effects and sibling IV estimates suggest bounds on causal effects. Our innovations relative to Ribar's work are deriving the identifying assumptions in terms of the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission models, a framework that is well suited to study the effects of parental investments on children's outcomes, and modeling time-varying heterogeneity.
Econometric Framework and Identification Problem
We investigate the effect of parental socialization actions on children's charitable giving using a model similar to that in Behrman et al. (1994) , Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) , and Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) . Using this framework we analyze the identification problem that arises in the presence of time-varying heterogeneity. Consider a model of charitable giving Y ijt for child i in family j at time t:
where X ijt is the parent's socialization action. There are four variables in (1) that model different components of a child's unobserved heterogeneity that affects a child's giving: µ j is a familyspecific time-constant prosocial endowment that is common to all members of the family j (e.g., due to genetic similarity); α ij is a child-specific prosocial endowment; θ ijt models time-varying idiosyncratic prosocial values; and v ijt models random shocks to the child's giving. The difference between θ ijt and v ijt is that in our model, parental socialization action will respond to θ ijt but not to v ijt . The object of estimation is parameter β, the effect of socialization action on children's giving. In our empirical work we consider two socialization actions: talking about giving and role-modeling, but in this section, to ease discussion we develop the model in terms of one action, e.g. talking about giving. For a two-child family, sibling k's outcome equation parallels (1):
Because the parental socialization decisions are made within a family context, the socialization variables X ijt and X kjt are themselves functions of family-related and child-related unobservables:
and
where u ijt and u kjt model random socialization shocks unrelated to children's endowments and idiosyncratic prosocial values. The parameters γ 1 , γ 2 , δ, π 1 , and π 2 , model the idea that there is unobserved heterogeneity across families and across children common to both children's giving behavior and parent's socialization decisions. As is well-known, unless all these parameters are zero, estimating (1) across children with heterogeneous µ j , α ij , and θ ijt is inconsistent for the causal effect β.
In equations (3) and (4) If we take the difference over time between siblings, it can be shown that the estimator b JT has:
Finally, we can construct a within-sibling estimator for β by taking the difference between the older sibling measured at an earlier time and the younger sibling measured at a later time. The resulting estimator b JDT can be shown to have:
We turn now to the interpretation of the biases in (9) and (15) The π 2 = π 1 line partitions the π 1 , π 2 plane such that to the northwest are (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs corresponding to parental compensation and to the southeast are pairs corresponding to reinforcement.
For example, if π 1 > 0, π 2 > 0, and π 2 > π 1 , in response to a one-unit exogenous increase in child i's prosocial values the parent would increase talking to child i by π 1 but also would increase talking to child k by π 2 so that ∆ T (X ijt − X kjt ) = π 1 − π 2 < 0: the parent talks relatively more to child k who did not experience the increase in prosocial values, hence compensating child k.
the parent talks relatively more to child i thereby reinforcing the exogenous change in prosocial values that favored child i. If π 2 = π 1 the parent is unresponsive ("neural") to within-sibling heterogeneity in θ. π 2 = π 1 implies equation (3) can be re-written as:
where we recall that the discussion is conditional on γ 1 − γ 2 = 0. Equation (3') makes plain an interesting interpretation of the identifying assumptions behind sibling fixed effects models: the assumptions permit a parental response to the sum total of her children's endowments, and to the sum total of prosocial values, but not to the within-sibling differences. It is as if in making her socialization responses to endowments and prosocial values, the parent uses her "average child" (meaning the average endowment and the average prosocial values) to determine her socialization responses to both children. Consistency of the difference over time between siblings estimator b JT does not require this identifying assumption in terms of endowments (γ 1 = γ 2 is not necessary), but does require it in terms of prosocial values (π 2 = π 1 is necessary).
In a similar manner the π 2 = −π 1 line partitions the π 1 , π 2 plane such that to the southwest are (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs corresponding to cultural substitution and to the northeast complementarity.
Recall that in the π 1 > 0, π 2 > 0, and π 2 > π 1 example above (northeast of the π 2 = −π 1 line), although the parent responded by talking relatively more to child k, the parent talked more to both children. Hence the parent complemented the exogenous increase in the sum total of her children's prosocial values by increasing the sum total of her talking about giving to children:
, the parent reduces the sum total amount of talking to her children, hence substituting away from talking about giving.
In the last example note that while substituting in terms of the sum total amount of talking, the parent talks less to child i and more to child k, thereby compensating the difference while substituting the sum total. The π 2 = π 1 and π 2 = −π 1 lines partition the π 1 , π 2 plane into four triangles in which the (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs correspond to compensation of differences and substitution of the sum total (the west triangle), reinforcement and substitution (the south triangle), reinforcement and complementarity (the east triangle), and compensation and complementarity (the north triangle). Consider (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs such that π In quadrant 4 (π 1 < 0 and π 2 > 0), compensation is relatively strong compared to the compensatory (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs on the same √ S-circle but in quadrant 1 (π 1 > 0, π 2 > 0, and π 2 > π 1 )
or quadrant 3 (π 1 < 0, π 2 < 0, and π 2 > π 1 ). At π 2 = −π 1 in quadrant 4 compensation is the strongest: in response to a one-unit increase in the prosocial values of child i the parent would decrease talking to child i by the same amount she increases talking to child k, so that the difference ∆ T (X ijt − X kjt ) = π 1 − π 2 = 2π 1 < 0 obtains its minimum, relative to all other (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs on the same √ S-circle. Conversely, at π 2 = −π 1 in quadrant 2, reinforcement is the strongest. In quadrant 3 cultural substitution is relatively strong: both π 1 and π 2 are negative, implying that the parent responds to exogenous increases in her children's prosocial values by taking less about giving to both children. At π 2 = π 1 in quadrant 3, substitution is the strongest. At π 2 = π 1 in quadrant 1, complementarity is the strongest.
The π 1 , π 2 plane also can be partitioned into regions characterized by different directions of bias in b T and b JT , following from straightforward inspection of equations (9) and ( If both bias terms are positive (π 1 > 0, π 1 − π 2 > 0) or both negative (π 1 < 0, π 1 − π 2 < 0) then:
where
The equality in the right-hand part of (17) defines the (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs at which the bias magnitudes are the same, the equal bias boundaries. In this case the boundaries can be expressed parsimoniously: π 2 = 0 and π 
In this case the equal bias boundary is the real root of the cubic equation (18) in which the parameters are functions of π 1 . There is only one real root (the discriminant is positive), but the solution of π 2 in terms of π 1 is not parsimonious. 3 We have graphed the equal bias boundaries in It can be shown that:
is consistent for β. 4 To be clear, by "relative" we mean relative to other (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs on the same √ S-circle. Pairs (0, π 2 ) have moderately strong compensation/complementarity (if π 2 > 0) or moderately strong reinforcement/substitution (if π 2 < 0) relative to other (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs on the same √ S-circle. By "moderately strong" we mean that (a) the (0, π 2 ) pairs on the √ S-circle are midway between zero compensation (on the π 2 = π 1 line) and the strongest compensation (on the π 2 = −π 1 line) combined with (b) being midway between zero complementarity (on the π 2 = −π 1 line) and the strongest complementarity (on the π 2 = π 1 line), or (c) midway between zero reinforcement and the strongest reinforcement combined with (d) zero substitution and the strongest substitution. If S is small then compensation/complementarity (or reinforcement/substitution) are small in terms of the parent's absolute overall response. might be long-term changes in role-modeling. We will describe this "long-term change" measure when we present the sensitivity analysis.
We work with three analysis samples. Table 1 Column 2 describes the sibling fixed effects sample. The sample consists of 576 sibling pairs (1,152 children) in which both children were old enough in CDS-2 to have been asked the giving question. A sibling pair is defined to be two children who share at least one parent in common.
Most of the sibling pairs share both parents (78 percent) or otherwise have a common birth mother (another 20 percent). Column 3 describes the across-time sibling fixed effects sample consisting of an older sibling in CDS-2 and a younger sibling in CDS-3. Finally, among the 576 sibling-pairs in column 2 there are 144 in which both siblings are present in CDS-2 and CDS-3. We use this sample in our difference over time between siblings model. We also estimated sibling fixed effects models for the 337 sibling pairs in CDS-3, but we do not present the results because they are qualitatively similar to results from the CDS-2 sibling sample. Table 2 This suggests that there will be lower precision in the estimates of the sibling fixed effects model. Panel C shows much more within-sibling variation in parent's talking about giving, because the talking is occurring at different times in this sibling sample: 27.8 percent of parents talked to one sibling but not the other about giving. The within-sibling variation in Panel C is similar to the within-child variation in Panel A. Table 3 presents estimates of a linear probability model of children's giving using the child fixed effects sample. The estimates in this and subsequent tables are unweighted. give (not shown but available upon request).
Empirical Results
In the difference over time between siblings specification in columns 3 and 4, the estimated effect of talking about giving becomes negative and larger in magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated.
Columns 5 and 6 use the sibling pairs in which one sibling is surveyed in CDS-2 and the other sibling in CDS-3: the across-time sibling fixed effects specification. In this specification the estimated effect of talking about giving is positive and the order of magnitude is similar to that in the child fixed effects specification. A role-modeling effect can be estimated in the across-time sibling fixed effect specification, but the estimated effect is negative and insignificant.
From the perspective of the robust role-modeling results in the experimental literature, the absence of a significantly positive role-modeling effect in the child fixed effects and across-time sibling fixed effects specifications is surprising. A possible explanation is measurement error. One approach to address the measurement error problem would be to ask the children what they know about their parents' giving. Unfortunately, the CDS did not include such questions. The best we can do is to consider alternative mappings of the available parental giving data to form alternative role-modeling variables. Table 5 contains the results using the child fixed effects sample. All specifications include the additional controls although the coefficients of socialization actions are the only estimates presented. Column 1 repeats the baseline specification from Table 3 Tables 3   and 4 . The results in Table 6 indicate very large effects of parents talking about giving among 
Discussion
We begin by discussing the verbal socialization results. The child fixed effects and across-time sibling fixed effects estimates (b T andb JDT ) suggest that talking to children about giving increases the probability that children give by .13. The sibling fixed effects and difference over time between siblings estimates (b J andb JT ) are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels; assuming that β ≥ 0 these insignificant estimates imply β ≈ 0, that is, to imply that talking to children about giving has zero causal effect. There are two inferences that can be drawn from these four estimates regardless of identifying assumptions one makes about parental compensation/reinforcement and cultural substitution/complementarity. First, parents neither compensate nor reinforce differences between their children's prosocial endowments, that is γ 1 = γ 2 . Two separate results lead to this conclusion: (a)b J =b JT and comparing the right-hand sides of equations (14) and (15) and (b)b T =b JDT and comparing equations (9) and (16). 6 Second, and in contrast, parents do socialize child i differently depending upon time-varying changes in child k's prosocial values, that is π 2 = 0. This is implied by the result thatb T =b JT and comparing equations (9) and (15).
The implication of π 2 = 0 is that it is necessary to use the identification framework based on the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission models developed in Section 3 to draw causal inferences from the estimates. We organize our discussion of the inferences that can be drawn from the identification assumptions and the estimates according to the triangles in 
The former is incompatible with our estimates, but the latter is compatible. It follows that holding identifying assumptions of parental compensation combined with cultural substitution leads to an inference from the estimates that the causal effect of talking to children about giving is bounded from below by .13.
Continuing with the south triangle, the identification assumptions are that parents reinforce changes in the difference between their children's prosocial values and that parents view the socialization actions of others as cultural substitutes. These assumptions are incompatible with the 6 The argument that the evidence implies γ 1 − γ 2 = 0 is somewhat more involved because while γ 1 − γ 2 = 0 is a sufficient condition for b J = b JT and for b T = b JDT , it is not a necessary condition. Specifically, it can be shown that the alternative to γ 1 − γ 2 = 0 that would also imply Replacing the probability limits with the estimates, the counterclockwise movement along the circle implies values of β from zero (at π 1 = π 2 ) to .13 (at the π 2 axis) with β = .065 at the equal bias boundary (because at the boundary β must be in the middle of the two estimates). Hence, identifying assumptions that parents compensate changes in their children's prosocial values, but relatively weakly, and that parents view the socialization actions of others as relatively strong cultural complements, lead to an inference from the estimates that β is bounded by [0, .13], with values in the lower part of this interval implied by relatively weaker compensation/stronger complementarity.
Continuing on the circle but entering the quadrant 4 portion of the north triangle the (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs correspond to relatively stronger compensation and relatively weaker cultural complementarity. Also, for all the (π 1 , π 2 ) pairs both b T and b JT are negatively biased, and the magnitude of
Hence, identifying assumptions of relatively strong compensation and relatively weak complementarity leads to the inference that β is bounded from below by .13.
To summarize, in order to infer that there is zero causal effect of talking to children about giving, it would be necessary to maintain an identifying assumption of cultural complementarity in the socialization of giving. More precisely, it would be necessary to maintain that there is either (a) strong cultural complementarity plus reinforcement of within-sibling changes in prosocial valuesor if not reinforcement only very weak compensation, or (b) weaker complementarity but which is necessarily combined with strong reinforcement of within-sibling changes plus overall strong parental responsiveness to the changes. In contrast, inferring a positive causal effect requires an identifying assumption of either (c) cultural substitution or (d) complementarity combined with stronger (than in (a)) compensation of within-sibling changes in prosocial values. The pattern of estimates rules out substitution combined with reinforcement. Therefore, the cultural substitution identifying assumption, combined with the pattern of estimates, implies compensation of changes in the difference between children's prosocial values. The inference that follows would be that the causal effect of talking to children about giving is bounded from below by .13. A positive causal effect also would follow from cultural complementarity as long as compensation was not too weak.
Moving to the role-modeling results, the child fixed effects estimates taken at face value imply a zero causal effect of role-modeling. The face value interpretation has some credibility because it is the child fixed effects specification (as well as the difference over time between siblings specification) that provides the empirical basis for inferring a positive causal effect of verbal socialization.
Nevertheless, there are three counter-arguments. The second counter-argument is that the role-modeling estimate could be biased toward zero by measurement error. We examined numerous alternative ways to construct the role-modeling variable, and for all of themb T was not significantly different from zero. It could be that all these alternative constructions suffer from a kind of measurement error that children do not know what, or even whether, parents are giving, so that even though a role-model is transmitted by parents it is not seen by children. This kind of measurement error could explain theb T ≈ 0 result, but carries with it an important substantive implication: parents are wasting a potentially effective way to raise charitable children by not taking steps to ensure their role-model of giving is seen by their children. Furthermore, for non-African-American girls role-modeling is estimated to have a large, statistically significant positive effect. This result works against a measurement error argument, and is in itself of substantive interest.
The third counter-argument is that it could be that regular parental giving across the years has a role-modeling effect in raising children who themselves become regular givers. That there is a strong association between regular parent giving and regular child giving in the child fixed effects sample supports this conjecture. Finally, if we had some evidence about π 1 and π 2 , even their signs, we would be able to rule out additional identifying assumptions as incompatible with the evidence about verbal socialization.
This also is an important topic for future research. Until then we draw our conclusions based on the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable: that parents treat the socialization actions of others as cultural substitutes. We favor this identifying assumption for two reasons that draw on core arguments from the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission literatures. Drawing on the intra-household allocation literature, assuming that the uses of parental time to achieve other socialization goals are normal goods, a Becker and Tomes (1979) family income argument implies that when a child's prosocial values increase because of the socialization of others, the parent will reduce her socialization of giving somewhat so that she can spend more time achieving other socialization goals. The counter-assumption of complementarity would require either that some other uses of parental time are non-normal goods, or perhaps a bounded rationality argument that increases in the child's prosocial values bring the goal of socializing giving to the forefront of the parent's mind and she in turn talks more about giving to her child. Drawing on the cultural transmission literature, that giving is heterogeneous in the population suggests cultural substitution, or at a minimum cultural complementarity that is not strong. In addition, the cultural substitution identifying assumption combined with the pattern of estimates implies that parents compensate within-sibling changes in prosocial values, consistent with thinking in child development about parental responses to within-sibling differences (Thomas and Chess 1977) .
Under an identifying assumption of cultural substitution, or weak cultural complementarity, the estimates imply that the causal effect of verbal socialization on the probability that children give to charity is at least .13.
Conclusion
This paper provides the first estimates of the effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling on children's charitable giving based on nationally-representative data from children in their home settings. A second contribution is that we develop a framework useful for identifying causal effects of parental socialization or investment actions on children's outcomes when there is timevarying unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome equation correlated with the actions parents take. The framework shows how bounds on the causal effects of parent socialization actions can be inferred from within-child and within-siblings estimates combined with identifying assumptions about how parents respond to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. The identifying assumptions are characterized using constructs from the well-known economic literatures on intra-household allocation and cultural transmission.
Applying this framework to parental socialization of children's charitable giving, the pattern of estimates indicates that parents socialize a child differently depending upon changes in his/her sibling's prosocial values. Under the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable-that parents treat the socialization actions of others as cultural substitutes-our estimates imply that talking to children about giving raises the probability they give by at least . 13 . Surprisingly, in light of the developmental psychology experiments, our estimates based on the full sample of children indicate no evidence that parents' role-model of giving has a causal effect on children's giving.
However, when we examine demographic sub-groups of children we find that role-modeling increases the probability that non-African-American girls give to charity by .14. The effect of talking about giving also differs by demographic group: .07 (not statistically significant) for nonAfrican-American girls, .18 for African-American girls and .22 for non-African-American boys.
The estimated effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling are positive for African-American boys (.08 and .06) but not statistically significant. To our knowledge these are the first estimates, even among results from the experimental papers, of the effectiveness of verbal socialization and role-modeling separately by demographic group.
The results have three implications. First, parents whose goal is to raise charitable children should continue, not curtail, conversations about giving as their children age through adolescence.
This is important because in our child fixed effects sample, 16 percent of the children have parents who stopped talking to them about giving as the children got older. Second, translational research is needed to learn how role-modeling, known to be effective in the laboratory, can be used effectively in the home. Finally, the identification framework we develop is generally applicable in applications having child and sibling fixed effects data that include measurement of parents' socialization and/or investment actions. Data on socialization/investment actions of those other than parents, or proxies for these actions, are necessary to further narrow down the range of intra-household and cultural transmission identifying assumptions compatible with the estimates. In turn this would narrow down the range of causal effects compatible with estimates from child and sibling fixed effects models. 
